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PURSUING CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE 
CHURCH AND ITS DECISION MAKERS FOR 
THEIR ROLE IN PRIEST SEXUAL ABUSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“I remember a number of years ago, the statement was made, if we 
don’t get our act together, the story isn’t going to be about priests, 
it’s going to be about bishops. And that’s where we are today.”  
—Bishop John F. Kinney1
Victims of priest sexual abuse have brought civil suits against the 
Catholic Church for several years.2 However, civil financial settlements 
are inadequate and fraught with many problems.3 Parishioners have been 
understandably angered that donations intended for good works in the 
community have been used to compensate for the criminal misdeeds of 
priests.4 Additionally, large civil settlements threaten diocesan solvency.5 
 1. Alan Cooperman, Bishops Forced to Weigh Their Own Culpability, WASH. POST, June 14, 
2002, at A15. 
 2. See Sacha Pfeiffer, Critical Eye Cast on Sex Abuse Lawyers: Confidentiality, Large 
Settlements Are Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, June 3, 2002, at A1. The BOSTON GLOBE reported that 
attorney Roderick MacLeish Jr. “estimates he has represented 400 alleged victims of sexual abuse by 
priests in the past decade.” Id. Additionally, the GLOBE reported that attorney Mitchell Garabedian 
“estimates he has represented 250 alleged victims of dozens of priests” between the “late 1980s” and 
2002. Id. The GLOBE also stated that Jeffrey R. Anderson “estimates he’s represented more than 1,000 
clergy sex abuse victims since taking his first case in the early 1980s.” Id. See also SUFFOLK COUNTY 
SUPREME CT. SPECIAL GRAND JURY, GRAND JURY REP. CPL § 190.85(1)(C), May 6, 2002 Term, at 
115 (2003) at http://www.co.suffolk.ny.us/da/drvc%20GRAND%20JURY%20REPORT.pdf 
[hereinafter SUFFOLK REP.] The Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, created an infrastructure to 
handle its “enormous” “potential liability.” Id. at 123. The Diocese created its Office of Legal Affairs 
in 1985. Id. at 115-16. “[I]ts primary purpose was to investigate and attend to allegations of child 
sexual abuse committed by priests.” Id. Also in 1985, the Diocese created the Uninsured Perils Fund, 
which was “established for the payment of claims relating to criminal activity by Diocesan priests . . . 
[I]ts ostensible purpose was to cover three areas of potential liability for which there was either zero, 
or limited amounts, of insurance available; sexual abuse claims, asbestos exposure and trampoline 
accidents.” Id. at 123. The Grand Jury quipped, “Not surprisingly, there have never been any payments 
made from the fund for either asbestos or trampoline accident claims.” Id. 
 3. See Pfeiffer, supra note 2. “In the view of their detractors, [attorneys who represented alleged 
victims] contributed to [the] coverup by signing secret settlements that prevented the scandal from 
erupting into pubic view sooner.” Id. See also Michael Paulson & Wendy Davis, Law Testifies Before 
Panel Considering Criminal Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2003, at B3. “Victim advocates say 
they are convinced that the church will not punish bishops who failed to stop abuse, and so they are 
pinning their hopes on prosecutors.” Id.  
 4. James F. McCarty & Joel Rutchick, Catholic Charities Seeks Pledge from Pilla: Don't Use 
Donations to Settle Sex Suits, Board Urges Bishop; Sex Scandal Roils Diocese Fund-Raisers; Catholic 
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Tragically, many victims were only able to collect settlements if they 
promised to remain silent about their abuse.6 This condition of 
confidentiality enabled predatory priests to continue to have access to 
future victims.7 Most importantly, the Church’s now-public failure to alter 
the pattern of behavior of its priests or their supervisors indicates that the 
years of civil settlements and damage awards did not provide adequate 
motivation for the Church to change its practices.8  
While state authorities have criminally prosecuted a few predatory 
priests,9 there has been little or no personal accountability on the part of 
the Bishops and Cardinals who placed predatory priests in parishes with 
ready access to children;10 gave false assurances to the families of the 
Charities Board Wants to Ensure Gifts Aren't Used to Settle Suits, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 2, 2002, at 
A1. 
 5. See Walter V. Robinson & Stephen Kurkjian, Bishops Blocked Bankruptcy Idea, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 25, 2003 at A1 (detailing the financial difficulties posed by over 500 pending claims 
against the Boston Archdiocese); See also Plight of Boston Archdiocese Is Not Unique, 40 BCD NEWS 
AND COMMENT No. 14, Jan. 15, 2003 (pointing out financial problems faced by the church in Dallas, 
Texas, Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Tucson, Arizona).
 6. “[V]irtually all those who went to the Church with claims of sexual misconduct by priests 
received settlements before they filed suit, an arrangement that left no public record of the crime 
committed by the abusing priests.” THE INVESTIGATIVE STAFF OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: 
THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 47 (2002) [hereinafter BETRAYAL]. 
 7. See SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 173. “[Diocesan officials] insisted upon confidentiality 
agreements in cases that were settled. This policy put children at risk inasmuch as victims were 
prohibited by law from speaking out about the criminal conduct of sexually abusive priests.” Id. 
 8. The failure of the Church to pursue meaningful changes to better protect children from sexual 
abuse can be seen in the Suffolk County, NY, Grand Jury Report concerning the Diocese of Rockville 
Center. Id. The Grand Jury looked to “the history of the Diocese” and found that “[d]iocesan officials 
agreed to engage in conduct that resulted in the prevention, hinderance[,] and delay in the discovery of 
criminal conduct by priests” and “us[ed] deception and intimidation to prevent victims from seeking 
legal solutions to their problems.” Id. Similarly, the Massachusetts Attorney General concluded: 
[T]he widespread abuse of children was due to an institutional acceptance of abuse and a massive 
and pervasive failure of leadership. For at least six decades, three successive Archbishops, their 
Bishops and others in positions of authority within the Archdiocese operated with tragically 
misguided priorities. They chose to protect the image and reputation of their institution rather than 
the safety and well-being of the children entrusted to their care. And they failed to break their code 
of silence even when the magnitude of what had occurred would have alerted any reasonable, 
responsible manager that help was needed. 
The Sexual Abuse of Children in the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, MASS. ATT’Y GEN. REP. 
at 73 (2003) [hereinafter MASS. REP.]. 
 9. Cathy Lynn Grossman & Anthony DeBarros, Special Report: Facts of Priest Sex Abuse at 
Odds with Perception, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 2002, at 1A (“23 priests have been convicted of sex 
crimes since 1965 . . . .”).  
 10. See MASS. REP., supra note 8, at 59-72. See also BETRAYAL, supra note 6, at 130. Essex 
County Massachusetts District Attorney Kevin Burke discussed his interaction with the Church during 
a 2000 prosecution of an abusive priest, stating, “They weren’t sorry for what happened to those kids 
. . . . I don’t think the cardinal and the rest of the hierarchy ever really got that they were dealing with 
kids here. I don’t think they even see that today.” Id. at 128, 130. 
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victims;11 “shuffled” pedophile priests from one parish to another to avoid 
criminal prosecution;12 and mislead parishioners to believe that predatory 
priests had been removed from pastoral service.13  
The Archdioceses, Dioceses, and Church officials who engaged in 
conduct that enabled priests to sexually abuse children for decades should 
face criminal prosecution.14 Identifying the appropriate prosecutorial tools 
and theories of criminal liability is an essential first step. 
State iterations of Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
Acts may prove to be adept tools to prosecute the Church and its decision 
makers.15 Currently, thirty-one states have their own RICO statutes.16 
Several states have RICO statues that include sex crimes against children 
as predicate acts.17 Many have predicate crimes which encompass fraud.18 
Additionally, several state RICO provisions allow civil remedies and/or 
criminal fines for personal injury.19  
 11. See, e.g., id. at 44. “Church officials shuffled [accused priest] Porter from parish to parish in 
an effort to convince his victims that something had been done.” Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Complaint, Gomez v. Holy See et al., (Fla. 6th Judicial Cir.) at 
http://www.news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/religion/gomezhsee40302flcmp.pdf. “Authorities . . . were 
. . . informed that Defendant [Fr.] Burke was no longer there or available for interrogation, arrest or 
prosecution by Florida authorities . . . . Defendant Burke was intentionally moved by Defendants out 
of the jurisdiction of the local law enforcement authorities to New Jersey in order to avoid . . . criminal 
prosecution . . . . ” Id. at ¶ 14. 
 13. See SUFFOLK REP. supra note 2, at 174. “Diocesan officials used the hollow promise of 
treatment and re-assignment for offenders and the inducement of monetary payments to victims to 
guarantee their silence. This had the further effect of concealing and preventing the discovery of 
heinous crimes committed by priests.” Id. 
 14. See Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex 
Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285, 328-29 (1985). “[A]ny director, manager, or other 
supervisor who is aware of an employee’s criminal design and is able to take preventive measures but 
does nothing contributes to the performance of the offense.” Id. at 328.  
 15. See discussion infra Parts II.B, III.A. 
 16. The following states each have their own RICO statute: Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, 
Wisconsin. 1 DAVID R. MCCORMACK, RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS, § 9, at 9-
2 (11th ed. 2000). Additionally, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have RICO statutes. Id. 
 17. Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Texas, 
Utah, and the U.S. Virgin Islands each enumerate sexual crimes as predicate acts. Id. For a more 
detailed discussion, see discussion Part II.B.2 and accompanying footnotes infra. 
 18. 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 9-2. Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, each enumerate fraud as a predicate act. Id. For a more detailed discussion, see 
discussion Part II.B.3 infra. 
 19. 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 9-2. The state RICO statutes of Arizona, Florida, Idaho, 
Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, and the U.S. Virgin Islands allow recovery and 
or alternative bases for criminal fines based on personal injury. Id. For a more detailed discussion, see 
discussion Part II.B.4 infra. 
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For those states which do not have RICO statutes, or those whose 
RICO statutes are inadequate, prosecutors could possibly utilize 
alternative theories of criminal liability, including reckless endangerment20 
and hindering prosecution.21 Finally, prosecutors could rely on the master-
servant relationship between the predatory priests and their bishop, 
cardinal, and/or archdiocese to pursue criminal charges against the 
employer or supervisor for the criminal acts committed by the predatory 
priests.22
This Note will first outline in Part II.A the civil and criminal 
mechanisms used to date in the priest sex abuse context as well as the 
Church’s response to the sex abuse cases. Part II.B will examine various 
theories of criminal liability. Part III of this Note will make the argument 
that because civil damages and criminal prosecution of priests have been 
inadequate to remedy to the problem of priest sex abuse, states should 
criminally prosecute the Church and its decision makers for their role in 
the abuse of children. To wit, Part III of this Note will explore the 
possibility of using state RICO acts for criminal and civil actions and 
consider alternative theories for criminal prosecution of the Church’s 
decision makers. Part III will also address possible roadblocks to these 
methods of prosecution. Finally, Part IV will suggest how these problems 
might be overcome. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Scope of the Scandal  
In 1985, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops received a 
prescient report entitled, “The Problem of Sexual Molestations by Roman 
Catholic Clergy.”23 This report detailed the issues,24 predicted potential 
 20. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.7, at 246-56 (3d ed. 2000). 
 21. See, e.g., SUFFOLK REPORT, supra note 2, at 173. 
 22. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 3.3, at 215-24. 
 23. BETRAYAL, supra note 6, at 36.  
This report was written by Rev. Thomas P. Doyle, a canon lawyer then stationed at the Vatican 
embassy in Washington; the late Michael R. Peterson, then a psychiatrist and director of the St. 
Luke Institute; and F. Ray Mouton, a Louisiana attorney who was representing Rev. Gilbert 
Gauthe, who had been criminally charged with sexually molesting eleven boys in the Lafayette 
diocese. 
Id. at 36-37. 
 24. “[The authors of the report] reviewed the moral, spiritual, legal and economic consequences 
of sexual abuse by Catholic clergy and proposed a five-year project designed to protect children from 
pedophiles, homosexual and heterosexual predators, and the church itself.” Paul M. Rodriguez, Report 
of Church Troubles Proved Prophetic, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May 20, 2002, at 48, available at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/7
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liability surpassing $1 billion, detailed steps to limit the potential for harm, 
and advised against destroying damaging files or sending files concerning 
complaints to the Holy See25 with the expectation that diplomatic 
immunity would protect them from discovery.26 Furthermore, the report 
focused on the intractable nature of pedophilia, stating that “‘whether the 
person has received traditional psychiatric treatment or not[,] . . . 
[r]ecidivism is so high with pedophilia . . . that all controlled studies have 
shown that traditional outpatient psychiatric or psychological models 
alone DO NOT WORK.’”27 In conclusion, the report warned that 
pedophilia should be considered a “lifelong disease with NO HOPE AT 
THIS POINT IN TIME for [a] cure.”28  
However, the bishops failed to pay attention to the report.29 Instead, the 
Church often responded to allegations of sex abuse by moving priests to 
different parishes rather than reporting the allegations to the police.30 For 
example, rather than turn over Father James Porter to authorities for 
investigation,31 the Church hierarchy chose to move Porter to a succession 
of parishes “in an effort to convince victims that something had been 
done.”32 As a further illustration, Father John Geoghan engaged in thirty 
years of known sexual abuse in six successive parishes.33
http://www.lexis.com.
 25. “The Holy See is the international diplomatic branch of the Vatican City State. It is the Holy 
See, not the Vatican, that enters international agreements.” Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, Note, One Small Step 
for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 16 
BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 352 n.228 (2002).  
 “The Holy See has full diplomatic relations with 157 countries.” Yasmin Abdullah, Note, The 
Holy See at United Nations Conferences: State or Church?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1835, 1866 (1996) 
(citing 1996 CATHOLIC ALMANAC 47 (Felician A. Foy & Rose M. Avato eds., 1996). 
 26. BETRAYAL, supra note 6, at 40; Complaint, Cicchillo v. Archdiocese of Los Angeles, (C.D. 
L.A. Co.) et al., ¶ 16, at http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/religion/cicchillomhny 
42902cmp.pdf. 
 27. BETRAYAL, supra note 6, at 36 (quoting the 1985 Report to the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops) (emphasis in original). 
 28. Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). 
 29. Id. at 39. 
 30. See, e.g., id. at 36, 44. 
 31. Id. at 44. According to the attorney representing Porter’s alleged victims, a minimum of ten 
people told the two priests in Porter’s parish about Porter’s abuse. Id. These two priests also personally 
witnessed Porter’s abuse. Id. Porter even acknowledged his predilection for child molestation to the 
Vatican. Id. When he resigned in 1973, he wrote to the Vatican:  
I know in the past I used to hide behind a Roman collar, thinking it would be a shield for me. Now 
there is no shield. I know that if I become familiar with children, people would immediately 
become suspicious. . . In the lay life, I find out of necessity that I must cope with the problem or 
suffer the consequences.  
Id. at 44-45. 
 32. Id. at 44. 
 33. Id. at 53. See also id. at 207 (Letter from Rev. John Geoghan to Cardinal Humberto 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In addition, the Church frequently responded to allegations of priest 
sex abuse by reaching financial settlements with alleged victims, often 
conditioned on secrecy.34 Throughout the United States, millions of dollars 
have been paid by the Church to the victims of priest sex abuse.35  
However, some alleged victims of priest sexual abuse have refused to 
settle silently.36 The parent of one of Reverend Gilbert Gauthe’s victims 
took his case to court and was awarded $1.2 million by a jury.37 In 
addition to pain and suffering awards, some victims have sought and won 
punitive damages awards against the Church.38 But even in the absence of 
punitive damages, jury awards have been quite high.39 In Texas, the Dallas 
diocese came close to bankruptcy when a jury reached a $119.6 million 
dollar verdict in favor of eleven families whose children were sexually 
abused by Reverend Rudolph Kos.40 The jury stated that their large verdict 
was a result of the Church’s disregard for prior allegations against Kos, 
and the jury’s conclusion that Kos’s actions had caused one of the abused 
to take his own life.41 These large jury awards arguably reflect jury 
dissatisfaction with the Church’s response to allegations of abuse.42
While there are no comprehensive statistics of the numbers of victims, 
molesters, or settlement amounts,43 the New York Times conducted a 
Mederiros while undergoing treatment in 1980); Id. at 229 (Memorandum of the Archdiocese of 
Boston indicating that Geoghan was defrocked in 1998). 
 34. Id. at 47. “[V]irtually all those who went to the Church with claims of sexual misconduct by 
priests received settlements before they filed suit, an arrangement that left no public record of the 
crime committed by the abusing priests.” Id. 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 37. “In June of 1984, . . . the Lafayette [Louisiana] diocese secretly paid $4.2 
million dollars to nine of [Rev. Gilbert] Gauthe’s victims.” Id. A bishop subsequently revealed in a 
deposition that he was aware of allegations of sexual abuse against Gauthe as early as 1974. Id. Jeffery 
R. Anderson, a Minnesota lawyer, has represented “more than 400 alleged victims of clergy sexual 
abuse, winning millions of dollars in judgments and settlements from several dioceses across the 
country.” Id. at 40, 42. In New Mexico, the Santa Fe archdiocese was almost bankrupt after “abuse 
victims had filed some two hundred claims . . . [and received] through a combination of settlements 
and judgments [an] estimated . . . twenty-five and fifty million [dollars]. Id. at 42. The victims of The 
Rev. James Porter received seven million dollars from the church. Id. at 43. 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 38. 
 37. Id. This father, Glenn Gastal, told reporters that “the priest . . . had anally raped his son so 
viciously that the boy had to be hospitalized.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 41. “In 1990, a jury awarded [one former altar boy of the Rev. Thomas Adamson of 
Minnesota] $3.6 million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages - the first time a jury had ever 
awarded punitive damages against the Catholic Church in a clergy sexual abuse case.” Id. However, 
“[a] judge later stripped away most of the punitive damages . . . .” Id. 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 43. 
 40. Id. The families negotiated a reduced settlement of $31 million dollars with the Church. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Laurie Goodstein & Anthony Zirilli, Trail of Pain in Church Crisis Leads to Nearly Every 
Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 1. The New York Times labeled its survey “the most complete 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/7
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survey which indicated that as of January 1, 2003, over 1,200 priests have 
been accused of sexually abusing over 4,000 victims since the 1940s.44 
Additionally, the Washington Post conducted a survey that encompassed 
financial settlements made by the Church.45 The archdioceses were 
hesitant to discuss financial settlements with the Post; the survey showed 
only $106 million in admitted deals.46 However, attorneys for victims have 
asserted that the real figure approaches $1 billion.47 In September of 2003, 
the Boston Archdiocese agreed to an $85 million settlement with over 500 
victims.48
Despite these statistics, only a relative handful of priests have faced 
criminal charges.49 Furthermore, in several cases, the Church knew of 
allegations of abuse for a decade or more before the priests were 
prosecuted.50 For example, the Reverend Gilbert Gauthe of Louisiana 51 
was prosecuted 10 years after the Church first became aware of allegations 
of his sexual abuse.52 Father James Porter of Massachusetts, alleged to 
have sexually abused over one hundred individuals53 during the course of 
fourteen years,54 plead guilty to over forty counts of sexual assault in 
1992.55 As in the Gauthe case, the Church hierarchy knew of allegations 
against him decades earlier.56  
During the 2002 meeting of the United States Conference of Bishops, 
the bishops received a great deal of criticism for their role in the sexual 
abuse scandal.57 The Conference President, Bishop Wilton D. Gregory, 
compilation of data on the problem available,” but acknowledged that “[t]he Times data only include 
cases in which priests were named, and many bishops have released only partial lists of accused 
priests, or refused to identify any.” Id.  
 44. Id. 
 45. Alan Cooperman and Lena H. Sun, Hundreds of Priests Removed Since 60’s: Survey Shows 
Scope Wider than Disclosed, WASH. POST, June 9, 2002, at A1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Mark Miller, The Wages of Sin: The Archbishop of Boston Gets His $85 Million Deal Done, 
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 2003 at 34. 
 49. Grossman & DeBarros, supra note 9 (“23 priests have been convicted of sex crimes since 
1965, and 33 currently face charges.”).  
 50. See, e.g., BETRAYAL, supra note 6, at 205-49 (compiling photographic images of Church 
documents and correspondence regarding priest sex abuse).  
 51. Id. at 38. Gauthe pled guilty to “charges that included rape and possession of child 
pornography - photographs that Gauthe himself had taken of his victims.” Id. 
 52. Id. at 37-38. 
 53. Alan Cooperman, Wisconsin Archbishop Kept Silent on Predator Priest, WASH. POST, Apr. 
14, 2002, at A1. 
 54. BETRAYAL, supra note 6, at 43. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 44. 
 57. Edward Walsh, Bishops Told They Bear Responsibility for Scandal, WASH. POST, June 14, 
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placed blame squarely on the shoulders of the bishops, repeatedly stating, 
“We are the ones.”58 Bishop Gregory chastised his peers for permitting 
pedophile priests to continue in pastoral service; neglecting to inform the 
police of abuse allegations; sacrificing abuse prevention to protect the 
Church’s reputation; and failing to treat the victims and their families with 
appropriate care and concern.59 Finally, almost twenty years after the 1985 
report, the bishops voiced a movement towards “zero tolerance”60 for 
abusive priests and a shift in policy to report allegations of abuse to law 
enforcement authorities.61  
While the 2002 Conference may have signaled a sea change in the 
United States, the Vatican responded negatively to the bishops’ newfound 
intention to turn accused priests over to authorities.62 The Vatican revised 
the Dallas proposal to assert the primacy of Church run tribunals on the 
basis that the bishops’ proposal would violate canon law.63 Indeed, church 
officials have previously deferred to canon law over civil criminal law in 
the matter of sexual abuse of children.64 When Cardinal Law met with four 
experts in the field of child sexual abuse in 1993, he was told that “the 
way . . . [the Church] handled the cases was wrong and was endangering 
2002, at A1 [hereinafter Responsibility]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. Furthermore, three bishops and one archbishop have resigned after allegations of personal 
sexual misconduct and sexual abuse of minors. Edward Walsh, 2 More Bishops Resign in Sex Scandal: 
Church Leaders Meet to Discuss Policy on Abusive Priests, WASH. POST, June 12, 2002, at A1. “In 
New York, Auxiliary Bishop James F. McCarthy, 59, resigned as bishop and pastor . . . after admitting 
to having had ‘a number of affairs with women . . . . ’” Id. Additionally, “[i]n Lexington Ky., Bishop J. 
Kendrick Williams, 65, who has been accused of molesting three boys” resigned. Id. The list 
continues: 
Archbishop Rembert G. Weakland of Milwaukee resigned after the disclosure of a $450,000 
settlement the archdiocese made in 1998 with a man who had accused Weakland of sexually 
abusing him as an adult more than 20 years ago . . . . Bishop Anthony O’Connell of Palm Beach, 
Fla., resigned after admitting he abused an underage student when he was the rector of a Missouri 
Seminary.  
Id. 
 60. Responsibility, supra note 57. 
 61. Alan Cooperman, Church’s Revised Abuse Rules Stir Debate: Canon, Civil Law May 
Conflict, Experts Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2002, at A3 [hereinafter Conflict]. 
 62. Alan Cooperman, In Search of Clarity, and Fairness: Vatican Worries that U.S. Sex Abuse 
Policy Abandons ‘Due Process,’ WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2002, at A2; Daniel Williams & Alan 
Cooperman, Vatican Questioning Rules on Removal of U.S. Priests, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2002, at 
A1. 
 63. Conflict, supra note 61. “Catholic Church tribunals in the United States have dealt mainly 
with requests for marriage annulments. But the centuries-old system of canon law also sets out detailed 
procedures for tribunals to determine the innocence or guilt of people accused of crimes under church 
law . . . . ” Id. For more information on canon law, see Alan Cooperman, Abuse Policy Has Roots in 
Middle Ages: Process Set Up to Prevent Arbitrary Dismissals, WASH. POST, May 19, 2002, at A12. 
 64. See, e.g., BETRAYAL, supra note 6, at 153. 
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children.”65 While the experts “stressed the importance of reporting these 
cases to civil authorities,” Cardinal Law remained focused on canon law.66 
It should be noted that United States courts have repeatedly concluded that 
the First Amendment does not entitle one to commit crimes under the 
ambit of free exercise of religion.67  
To date, no bishop, cardinal, or archdiocese has faced criminal charges 
in connection with the child sex abuse scandal.68 However, grand juries 
were convened in Suffolk and Westchester Counties in New York.69  
The Westchester grand jury found that church officials recklessly 
concealed acts of child molestation and heaped shame upon the abused.70 
Furthermore, the grand jury concluded that diocesan officials “lied” to 
parish members during masses regarding the criminal acts of the priests.71 
The grand jury stated that the actions of church officials constituted “‘an 
orchestrated effort to protect abusing clergy members from investigation, 
 65. Id. at 152. 
 66. Id. at 152-53. One of the experts commented that “[w]hatever we had just told [Cardinal 
Law] didn’t seem to be registering.” Id. at 153. This expert later lamented, “Children were being 
abused. Sexual predators were being protected. Canon law should have nothing to do with it. But they 
were determined to keep this problem, and their response to it, within their culture.” Id. The conflict 
between canon law and civil law is examined in Marianne Perciaccante, Note, The Courts and Canon 
Law, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171 (1996). Perciaccante asserts that “[t]he point at which courts 
unconstitutionally trespass on a religion’s private domain in cases where they attempt to resolve non-
intrachurch religious disputes is not entirely clear from . . . any of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
past fifty years.” Id. at 171. 
 67. The Supreme Court has determined that “while [laws] cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
This conclusion is echoed in more recent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 
1210, 1227 (C.A.N.Y. 1983). “The ‘free exercise’ of religion is not so unfettered. The first amendment 
does not insulate a church or its members from judicial inquiry when a charge is made that their 
activities violate a penal statute.” Id. The Supreme Court in Reynolds decided that to conclude 
otherwise “would . . . make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land 
. . . .” Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167. The court found that “[g]overnment could exist only in name under 
such circumstances.” Id.  
 Later, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court stated, “The First Amendment embraces two 
concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the 
second cannot be.” 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).  
 Similarly, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that a law which prohibited 
children from working in the streets was constitutional, despite the law’s effect on Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944). The Court concluded that “the state has a wide range of 
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this 
includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.” Id. at 167.  
 68. Michael Powell & Pamela Ferdinand, N.Y. Grand Jury Accuses Diocese of Covering Up 
Abuse by Clergy, WASH. POST, June 20, 2002, at A3. “No church official in a supervisory position has 
ever been charged with a crime in connection with a sex abuse case.” Id. 
 69. Diocese Probed on Sex Abuse Coverup, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2002, at A14; Powell & 
Ferdinand, supra note 68. 
 70. Powell & Ferdinand, supra note 68. 
 71. Id. 
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arrest and prosecution.’”72 The Suffolk County Grand Jury reached 
disturbingly similar conclusions.73
Another grand jury was convened by the Massachusetts Attorney 
General to examine evidence showing that the Boston Archdiocese and 
Cardinal Bernard F. Law “failed to protect clergy sexual abuse victims 
from suspected pedophile priests.”74 Upon its release in 2003, the Attorney 
General’s report stated that “a tragedy of unimaginable dimensions” had 
transpired within the Boston Archdiocese.75 According to the Attorney 
General’s report, the Boston Archdiocese had received reports of 789 
victims of sexual abuse.76 The records implicated 250 priests and Church 
employees.77  
The Massachusetts Attorney General determined that “widespread 
assault on children” took place over the course of sixty years, and during 
the reign of three different Archbishops.78 While the Attorney General did 
not uncover evidence of current abuse, he stated that “it is far too soon to 
conclude that the abuse has stopped and will not reoccur in the future.”79  
The report attributed the staggering number of sexual assaults “to an 
institutional acceptance of abuse and a massive and pervasive failure of 
leadership.”80 Nonetheless, the Massachusetts Attorney General “did not 
produce evidence sufficient to charge the Archdiocese or its senior 
managers with crimes.”81
 72. Id.  
 73. SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 172-74. 
 74. Powell & Ferdinand, supra note 68. 
 75. Letter from Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to the 
People of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at 1 (July 23, 2003) (published in MASS. REP., supra 
note 8. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 2. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. The Attorney General’s “investigative team” looked for evidence of the following crimes:  
Accessory After the Fact to a Felony—requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant rendered aid to a felon with the specific intent to help him avoid or escape detention, 
arrest, trial, or punishment;  
Accessory Before the Fact to a Felony—requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant shared the primary felon’s state of mind and aided in the commission of the felony by 
counseling, hiring or encouraging the felony to be committed;  
Conspiracy—requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered into an 
agreement with one or more people where the objective was criminal or unlawful, or the means of 
achieving the objective was criminal or unlawful;  
Obstruction of Justice (Common Law)—requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant knowingly interfered with the testimony or role of a witness in a judicial proceeding. 
MASS. REP., supra note 8, at 21. 
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Additionally, New Hampshire’s Attorney General, Philip T. 
McLaughlin, notified the public that his office had amassed the evidence 
necessary to bring “‘one or more indictments against the Diocese of 
Manchester for endangering the welfare of children.’”82 However, the New 
Hampshire Attorney General decided not to pursue the indictments after 
the Diocese agreed to concede the sufficiency of the state’s evidence and 
to take a number of measures designed to safeguard children.83 To date, 
grand juries have convened in five additional cities.84  
Because civil damages, untimely criminal prosecution of priests, and 
the Church’s reliance on canon law have been largely inadequate remedies 
to stop the overarching problem of priest sex abuse,85 states should 
prosecute the Church and its decision makers for their role in the abuse of 
children. Corporations and their officers can face prosecution for criminal 
wrongdoing;86 the Church and its officers should likewise be held 
criminally accountable for their role in the sexual abuse of children.87  
B. Prosecutorial Tools and Theories of Criminal Liability 
State RICO statutes may prove to be a valuable tool to prosecute the 
Church and its officials.88 While most RICO statutes were initially enacted 
to combat organized crime,89 RICO statutes are also used to prosecute 
corporate crimes.90  
 82. Paulson & Davis, supra note 3.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. “In several cities around the country, including Boston, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Los 
Angeles, Philadelphia, Phoenix, and St. Louis, grand juries are now investigating the Roman Catholic 
Church's handling of sexually abusive priests. None has issued criminal indictments.” Id.  
 85. See, e.g., id. “Victim advocates say they are convinced that the church will not punish 
bishops who failed to stop abuse, and so they are pinning their hopes on prosecutors.” Id. See also 
notes 2, 3, 49-56, 65-66 and accompanying text supra. 
 86. See generally KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2d ed. 1993); 
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME, CASES AND MATERIALS 
[hereinafter WHITE COLLAR CRIME](3d ed. 2002). 
 87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 88. See generally discussion infra Parts II.B, III.A. 
 89. See David Kurzweil, Note, Criminal and Civil RICO: Traditional Canons of Statutory 
Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 41, 58 (1996). 
“The original purpose of RICO was to stop the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into 
legitimate organizations by creating new criminal and civil remedies and investigative procedures.” Id. 
(citing S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 76 (1969)).  
 90. WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 86, at 527 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN 
EXPLANATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS STATUTE 2 (4th ed.) 
(regarding the role of Federal RICO in prosecutions of corporations). For an example of a state RICO 
law used to prosecute corporate crimes, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-201 – 13-2318 (West 2001). 
This statute “is one of the broadest and most frequently used state RICO statutes, as the Attorney 
General’s Office has aggressively employed the statute both criminally and civilly against white-collar 
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There are several advantages to utilizing state RICO statutes. First, 
many state RICO statutes include a number of state crimes as predicate 
acts, including child sex abuse.91 Second, state RICO provisions generally 
afford a lengthy period of time to prosecute offenders.92 Third, some state 
RICO statutes recognize personal injury.93 Fourth, state RICO statues 
frequently provide injunctive relief.94 Fifth, unlike the federal RICO 
statute, state RICO prosecutions do not require the participation or 
approval of the Justice Department.95 Finally, most state RICO statutes do 
not mandate a financial motive and can therefore be used against non-
profit corporations like churches.96
1. Overview of RICO Elements 
While the elements of state RICO statutes vary,97 some generalizations 
may be made because many state statutes are modeled after the federal 
RICO statute.98 Put very simply, the federal statute prohibits, among other 
things, “participat[ing], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] 
crime.” 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.01, at 9-10. “A trio of states makes false statements by 
corporate officials . . . predicate offenses.” Id. at 9-4. 
 91. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 92. See 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.01, at 9-1. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 9-4. States that do mandate a financial incentive include Washington, Arizona, 
Tennessee, and California. Id. 
 97. See generally id. at 9-1 to 9-10. 
 98. Id. at 9-3 to 9-4. “Virtually all of the state laws have provisions modeled upon 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1962(b) and (c).” Id. at 9-5. “[T]here are at least 4 states, Arizona, California, Georgia and North 
Dakota, that do not include an illegal investment provision modeled on 18 U.S.C. 1962(a).” Id. The 
Federal RICO statute 18 U.S.C. 1962 states:  
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, 
from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to use or invest . . . any part of such income . . . in 
acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged 
in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.  
 . . .  
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to acquire or 
maintain . . . any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in . . . interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, 
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly 
or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.  
 . . .  
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection 
(a), (b), or (c) of this section.  
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988). 
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enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”99 
Accordingly, many state RICO statutes require prosecutors to establish the 
existence of an “enterprise” as well as a “pattern of racketeering 
activity.”100 Certain enumerated crimes constitute predicate acts that 
satisfy the “racketeering activity” requirement of the federal statute.101 
However, many state statutes expand on the federal statute’s list of 
predicate offenses to include a far greater variety of crimes.102  
2. Sexual Abuse as a Predicate Crime 
Indeed, many state RICO statutes include sex crimes against children 
as predicate acts, including: Colorado,103 Georgia,104 Indiana,105 
Michigan,106 Mississippi,107 Nevada,108 Oklahoma,109 Rhode Island,110 
Texas,111 Utah,112 and the U.S. Virgin Islands.113
 99. Id. 
 100. 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.01, at 9-6 to 9-7.  
 101. Id. at 9-3. “One category is various state offenses, including murder, kidnapping, arson, [and] 
robbery . . . . Other offenses . . . include violation of Title 11, bankruptcy violations, . . . dealing in 
narcotics, violations of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, . . . [and] a lengthy list 
of violations of Title 18, the federal criminal code.” Id. 
 102. Id. at 9-4. “Some of the state laws, such as those in Georgia and North Carolina, encompass 
almost the entire criminal code of the respective states.” Id.  
 103. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-17-103(5)(6)(V) (West 1999) (“sexual exploitation of 
children”). See also 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.03, at 9-28 (discussing predicate crimes under 
the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act generally). 
 104. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(9)(A)(V) (2003) (“bodily injury and related offenses”). See also 1 
MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.07, at 9-63. 
 105. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1(8) (West 1998) (“child exploitation”). See also 1 
MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.11, at 9-84. 
 106. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.159g(n) (West 2003) (“child sexually abusive activity or 
material”). See also 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.13, at 9-95. 
 107. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-3 (2000) (“exploitation of children and enticing children for 
concealment, prostitution or marriage”). See also 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.15, at 9-103. 
 108. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.360(6), (11) (West 2000) (sexual assault and statutory rape). 
See also 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.16, at 9-109. 
 109. OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1402(10)(c), 1403 (West 2003). See also 1 MCCORMACK, supra 
note 16, § 9.23, at 9-158 (“various sex offenses” and “acts that cause bodily harm”).  
 110. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-1(c) (1999) (“child exploitations for . . . immoral purposes”). See 
also 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.26, at 9-177 (describing the predicate acts of the Rhode Island 
RICO Act generally). 
 111. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003) (sexual assault). See also 1 
MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.28, at 9-195.  
 112. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(4)(n) (1999); (“sexual exploitation of a minor”). See also 1 
MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.29, at 9-197. 
 113. 14 VI. CODE ANN. § 604(c)(11) (1996) (“relating to children”). See also 1 MCCORMACK, 
supra note 16, § 9.33, at 9-219. 
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In Miskovsky v. Oklahoma, state prosecutors utilized Oklahoma’s state 
RICO statute114 to convict an attorney who “was charged with racketeering 
by using his law practice to engage in criminal sexual behavior with both 
adult female clients and children of clients from 1976 through 1996.”115 
Following his conviction, Miskovsky appealed.116  
First, Miskovsky asserted that “his prosecution was an attempt to 
punish him for ‘garden-variety’ sex crimes on which the statute of 
limitations had run.”117 Nevertheless, the court concluded that “[t]he fact 
that the statute of limitations had expired on several of the substantive 
felony charges did not preclude their use as predicate offenses for 
RICO.”118  
Second, Miskovsky argued that his law firm could not constitute an 
enterprise.119 However, the court concluded that Miskovsky’s practice did 
in fact constitute an enterprise.120 Not only did it operate as a “legitimate 
business entity,” but it also served as a means for Miskovsky to come into 
contact with his victims - women and children he would not have 
encountered but for his practice.121 The court found “evidence of a 
continuing pattern of sexual abuse to adults and children extending over 
several years.”122  
Additionally, Miskovsky challenged the state’s proof of the “pattern” 
requirement.123 To determine whether the prosecution had met its burden, 
the court looked for evidence of “continuity of racketeering activity,”124 a 
requirement that the Supreme Court imposed in H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell 
Tel.125 This “continuity” can encompass “either a closed period of repeated 
 114. OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1403. 
 115. Miskovsky v. Oklahoma, 31 P.3d 1054, 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001). 
 116. Id. at 1058. 
 117. Id. at 1059. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1063. 
 120. Id. at 1062-63. 
 121. Id.  
Evidence showed one child victim’s father . . . first approached Miskovsky to consult him on a 
legal matter. Subsequently the families became friends, creating the opportunity for Miskovsky to 
commit rape by instrumentation on the victim in his swimming pool. Another child victim 
encountered Miskovsky at a work-related party given by Miskovsky and the man with whom he 
shared an office. The victim was the daughter of the other man’s secretary, and neither would have 
been at the party absent the business relationship. A third child victim met Miskovsky when her 
mother approached him, seeking to give up her parental rights and place the child for adoption.  
Id. at 1063. Furthermore, “he encountered all the adult victims through his law practice.” Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. H.J. Inc. v. NW Bell Tel., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989) (imposing a necessary finding of “a 
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conduct, or . . . past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with 
a threat of repetition.”126 The Miskovsky court found that the state had 
proven that “the predicate acts were part of an overall scheme and must be 
considered together . . . [T]he predicate acts encompass several victims, 
extended over several years, and required a series of schemes of actions 
resulting in distinct injuries to the victims.”127 The Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals upheld Miskovsky’s conviction.128
3. Fraud as a Predicate Crime 
While some state RICO statutes do not include sexual abuse as a 
predicate offense, prosecutors may nevertheless be able to impose criminal 
liability on the Church and its officials under state RICO statutes by 
utilizing crimes of fraud as predicate acts. The following states have 
included predicate crimes of fraud in their RICO statutes: Arizona,129 
Colorado,130 Florida,131 Idaho,132 Indiana,133 Michigan,134 New Mexico,135 
New York,136 North Dakota,137 Oklahoma,138 Texas,139 Utah,140 
Wisconsin,141 and the U.S. Virgin Islands.142 While the state RICO statutes 
utilize varying definitions of fraud, some generalizations can be made.143  
threat of continuing activity”).  
 126. Id. at 241. The Court further remarked, “Whether the predicates proved establish a threat of 
continued racketeering activity depends on the specific facts of each case.” Id. at 242. 
 127. Miskovsky, 31 P.3d at 1064. 
 128. Id. at 1066. 
 129. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301 (West 2001) (enumerating several types of fraud that can 
be used as predicate acts). Arizona’s RICO statue is “one of the broadest and most frequently used 
state RICO statues, as the Attorney General’s office has aggressively employed the statute both 
criminally and civilly against white-collar crime. Private civil use of the statute also appears to be on 
the rise.” 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.01, at 9-10. 
 130. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-17-103(5)(b)(IV) (West 1999) (“offenses involving fraud”). 
 131. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(25) (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.102(22) et. seq. (West 
1997). 
 132. IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(10) (Michie 1997). 
 133. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1(16) (West 1998). 
 134. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.159g (West 2003). 
 135. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-3(6) (Michie 2002). 
 136. NY PENAL LAW § 460.10(a) (McKinney 2000) (“schemes to defraud”). 
 137. N.D. CENT. CODE, § 12.1-06.1-01(f)(15) (1997). 
 138. OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1402(10)(t), 1403 (West 2003). 
 139. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(8) (Vernon 2003). 
 140. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(4) (1999) (referencing several varieties of fraud that 
constitute predicate acts). 
 141. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(4) (West 1996). 
 142. 14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 604(e)(16) (1996).  
 143. See supra notes 129-42.  
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Overall, the federal courts have interpreted fraud “by [a] nontechnical 
standard”144 rather than narrowly defining the term.145 The federal bench 
has found fraud in a broad array of circumstances which fail to comport 
with the level of “moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and 
right dealing in the general and business life of members of society.”146 
Accordingly, fraud has been found to encompass “conduct that involves a 
breach of duty and that results in harm to another, conduct that involves an 
attempt to gain an undue advantage or to inflict harm through 
misrepresentation or breach of duty, and conduct that is inconsistent with 
recognized moral standards.”147
4. Additional Benefits of State RICO Statutes 
Prosecutors may find an additional advantage to utilizing state RICO 
statutes to prosecute those responsible for priest sex abuse: several states’ 
RICO statutes consider the personal injury of victims as a factor affecting 
damages or criminal fines.148 States that recognize personal injury in this 
manner include: Arizona,149 Florida,150 Idaho,151 Mississippi,152 Nevada,153 
New Mexico,154 Oklahoma,155 and the U.S. Virgin Islands.156
 144. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958).  
 145. 2 BRICKEY, supra note 86, § 8:32, at 89 (citations omitted). Professor Brickey quotes United 
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. Mass. 1942) as follows: “[T]o try to delimit 
‘fraud’ by definition would tend to reward subtle and ingenious circumvention and is not done.” Id. 
n.444. 
 146. Gregory, 253 F.2d at 109 quoted in Blachy v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir 
1967), cited in 2 BRICKEY, supra note 86, § 8:32 at 90 n.448. 
 147. 2 BRICKEY, supra note 86, § 8:32 at 89 (citations omitted).  
 148. See infra notes 149-56. 
 149. 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.01, at 9-17.  
Civil remedies for violations of Arizona’s racketeering laws are set forth in § 13-2314 and § 13-
2314.04 each of which contains provisions for injunctive relief and the award of damages to civil 
plaintiffs injured by racketeering activities . . . . Section 13-2314 empowers the State of Arizona to 
file an action in superior court on behalf of a person who sustains injury to his person . . . by 
racketeering as that term is defined in the Act for the recovery of treble damages and the costs of 
the suit including reasonable attorney’s fees or to prevent restrain or remedy racketeering as 
defined in the Act.  
Id. 
 150. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (12) (West 2000). This statute states:  
[I]n lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law, any person convicted of . . . [unlawful racketeering 
activity] in violation of the provisions of § 895.03 through which he has derived pecuniary value, 
or by which he has caused personal injury . . . may receive a fine that does not exceed 3 times the 
gross value gained or 3 times the gross loss caused, whichever is the greater, plus court costs and 
the costs of investigation and prosecution, reasonably incurred.  
Id. § 895.04(2). 
 151. IDAHO CODE § 18-7805(d)(4) (Michie 1997). This statute “provides a treble-damages remedy 
for private parties who sustain injury to their . . . person . . . by a pattern of racketeering activity.” 1 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss3/7
p885 Russell book pages.doc2/6/2004   2:54 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] PURSUING CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE CHURCH 901 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the advantages of using state RICO provisions for 
criminal prosecutions, several state RICO statutes allow for civil RICO 
cases as well.157 These provisions could potentially allow the victims of 
priest sex abuse a cause of action.158 Usually, Attorneys General are also 
enabled by state RICO statutes to pursue civil actions.159 Civil RICO suits 
can be used to seek treble damage awards, and sometimes punitive 
damages as well.160  
Because many state RICO statutes allow equitable relief, including 
drastic injunctions, these statutes may provide a powerful mechanism for 
change within offending churches.161 For example, Florida allows the 
court to mandate that the convicted offender “divest himself or herself of 
any interest in any enterprise.”162 Additionally, Florida courts may place 
“reasonable restrictions upon the future activities . . . of any defendant.”163 
Furthermore, the court may mandate “dissolution or reorganization of any 
enterprise” and may require “forfeiture of the charter of a corporation . . . 
upon a finding that . . . a managerial agent . . . authorized or engaged in 
conduct violative of . . . the [Act].”164
In sum, prosecutors may find state RICO provisions provide powerful 
tools to hold the Church and its officials criminally responsible for the 
sexual abuse inflicted by predatory priests.  
MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 1.09, at 9-77. 
 152. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-7, 97-43-9 (2000). 
 153. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.410 (West 2000). 
 154. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-6(A) (Michie 1978). 
 155. OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1403(B) (West 2003). 
 156. 14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 606(b) (1996). 
 157. 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 9-1 to 9-2.  
 158. See id. 
 159. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314(A) (West 2001). 
 160. 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9, at 9-2. 
 161. The following states provide injunctive relief: Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(1) (West 
2000)); Georgia (GA.CODE ANN. § 16-14-6(a) (2003)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-7805(b) (Michie 
1997)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS, § 750.159j(4)(a)-(e) (West 2003)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 97-43-9(1) (2000)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-6(B)-(C) (Michie 1978)); New 
York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1353 (McKinney 2000)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE, § 12.1-06.1-05(1)-
(2) (1997)); see Oklahoma (OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1409(A) (West 2003)); and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands (14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 604 (1996)). 
 162. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(1)(a) (2000). 
 163. Id. § 895.05(1)(b). 
 164. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.05(1) (2000). 
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5. Reckless Endangerment 
In the absence of appropriate RICO provisions, some states could seek 
to prosecute Church decision makers under reckless endangerment 
statutes.165 A typical definition of reckless endangerment requires an 
individual to “recklessly engage[] in conduct which creates a substantial 
risk of serious physical injury to another person.”166 Unfortunately, this 
definition is unlikely to prove useful within the specific context of child 
sexual abuse because sexual abuse is unlikely to fall within statutory 
definitions of “serious physical injury.”167  
Nonetheless, a few states have defined reckless endangerment or 
reckless conduct in a manner that could possibly encompass sexual abuse 
of children because these definitions only require that a person “recklessly 
engage[] in conduct which creates a risk of physical injury to 
another person.”168 The mental state of recklessness requires the actor to 
consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk created by the 
actor’s conduct.169 Furthermore, the actor’s conduct must be a “gross 
 165. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 3.7, at 246-56. 
 166. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-24(a) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.250(a) (Michie 2002); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 1998). Several additional states utilize very similar language. See, 
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 18-3-208 (West 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-714(1) (2002); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIMINAL § 3-204(a)(1) (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 12.1-17-03 (1997); 18 PA. CONST. 
STAT. ANN. § 2705 (West 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103(a) (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
112(1) (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1025 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.050(1) (West 
2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-504(a) (Michie 1988). 
 167. For a typical definition of “serious physical injury,” see D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3001(7) 
(2001): 
(7) “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, 
unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.
Id. 
 168.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-64(a) (West 2001) (“Reckless endangerment in the second 
degree”). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(b) (2003) (defining “reckless conduct”): 
(b) A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by 
consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or 
endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Id. See also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-5(a) “Reckless Conduct. (a) A person who causes bodily harm 
to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual by any means, commits reckless conduct if he 
performs recklessly the acts which cause the harm or endanger safety, whether they otherwise are 
lawful or unlawful.” Id.  
 169. LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 3.7, at 247, 254. See generally id. § 3.7, at 246-56. 
‘Recklessness’ in causing a result exists when one is aware that his conduct might cause the result, 
though it is not substantially certain to happen . . . Indeed, if there is no social utility in doing what 
he is doing, one might be reckless though the chances of harm are something less than 1%. Thus, 
. . . recklessness requires a consciousness of something far less than certainty or even probability. 
Id. at 254 (emphasis in original). 
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deviation” from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
exercise in the same or similar circumstances.170 In 2002, Massachusetts 
specifically enumerated the risk of child sexual abuse and a failure to 
“alleviate” that risk as part of its reckless endangerment statute.171  
Several states might also be able to prosecute Church dioceses or 
archdioceses in their corporate forms under a recklessness theory 
implicating the actions of a “high managerial agent.”172 These states have 
statutes which establish corporate criminal liability when, “[t]he conduct 
constituting the offense is . . . recklessly tolerated by . . . a high managerial 
agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the 
corporation.”173 Because church dioceses are non-profit corporations with 
 170. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 171. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13L (West 2003). The statute states in relevant part: 
“Whoever wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily 
injury or sexual abuse to a child or wantonly or recklessly fails to take reasonable steps to alleviate 
such risk where there is a duty to act . . . .” is criminally liable. Id. Furthermore, the statute states:  
For the purposes of this section, such wanton or reckless behavior occurs when a person is aware 
of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts, or omissions where 
there is a duty to act, would result in serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child. The risk must 
be of such nature and degree that disregard of the risk constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.  
Id.  
 172. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20(1)(b) (McKinney 1998). “‘High managerial agent’ means an 
officer of a corporation or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the 
formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.” 
Id.  
 173. Id. § 20.20(2)(b) (2002). For another example of statutory language describing the criminal 
liability of a corporation as incurred by a high managerial agent, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-305 
(West 2001).  
A. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, an enterprise commits an offense if: 
1. The conduct constituting the offense consists of a failure to discharge a specific duty imposed 
by law; or 
2. The conduct undertaken in behalf of the enterprise and constituting the offense is engaged in, 
authorized, solicited, commanded or recklessly tolerated by the directors of the enterprise in any 
manner or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of employment; or 
3. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the enterprise while acting 
within the scope of employment and in behalf of the enterprise; and 
(a) The offense is a misdemeanor or petty offense; or 
(b) The offense is defined by a statute which imposes criminal liability on an enterprise. 
B. As used in this section: 
1. “Agent” means any officer, director, employee of an enterprise or any other person who is 
authorized to act in behalf of the enterprise. 
2. “High managerial agent” means an officer of an enterprise or any other agent in a position of 
comparable authority with respect to the formulation of enterprise policy. 
Id. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-502 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-606 (West 
1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 281 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-227 (Michie 1999); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/5-4 (2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 703.5 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 502.050 
(Michie 1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 562.056 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-311 (2000); N.J. STAT. 
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bishops and cardinals staffing upper-level management positions, 
prosecutors could conceivably prosecute Church dioceses under these 
statutes.174  
6. Hindering Prosecution 
Yet another theory of criminal liability for church officials might 
possibly be found in various state statutes which prohibit hindering 
prosecution.175 The elements of hindering prosecution typically include the 
intent “to prevent, hinder or delay the discovery or apprehension of, or the 
lodging of a criminal charge against, another person whom such person 
knows or believes has committed a felony”176 and the act of “prevent[ing] 
or obstruct[ing], by means of . . . intimidation or deception, any person 
from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension 
of such other person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against such 
other person.”177
Many states, as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
expressly prohibit hindering prosecution by statute.178 Additionally, it 
should be noted that New York, North Dakota, and Utah enumerate 
hindering prosecution as a predicate crime under their state RICO 
provisions.179 Prosecutors may find that hindering prosecution statutes, 
ANN. § 2C:2-7 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.23 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 161.170 (1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 307 (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-404 
(1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22 (Vernon 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.030 (West 
2000). 
 174. See generally The U.S. Catholic Church: How It Works, BUS. WK., Apr. 15, 2002 available 
at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_15/b3778004.htm. 
 175. See, e.g., SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 173. The Suffolk County Grand Jury Report 
reached the following conclusion concerning the Diocese of Rockville Center: 
The evidence before the Grand Jury clearly demonstrates that Diocesan officials agreed to engage 
in conduct that resulted in the prevention, hindrance and delay in the discovery of criminal 
conduct by priests. They conceived and agreed to a plan using deception and intimidation to 
prevent victims from seeking legal solutions to their problems. 
Id. 
 176. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-165 (West 2003). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-10-42 to -44 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.770 (Michie 
2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2510 to 13-2512 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-105 
(Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-165 to 53a-167 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 1244 (Michie 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 710-1028 to 710-1030 (Lexis 1999); KEN. REV. 
STAT. § 520.120 (2002); MO. REV. STAT. § 575.030 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-3 (West 1995 & 
Supp. 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 205.50, 250.55, 250.60 (McKinney 1999); ORE. REV. STAT. 
§ 162.325 (1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5105 (West 1983). 
 179. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(1)(a) (McKinney 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(f)(13) 
(1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1602(4)(tt) (1999). See also 1 MCCORMACK, supra note 16, § 9.19, 
at 9-130; § 9.21, at 9-141; § 9.29, at 9-197. 
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alone, or in connection with a state RICO statute, could be valuable tools 
to prosecute Church decision makers who act to protect pedophile priests 
instead of children.  
7. Omission to Act 
Because they failed to control the predatory actions of priests, church 
officials may also be criminally liable for their failure to act. While it is 
true that most theories of criminal liability are based on an individual’s 
acts, crimes can be committed by an individual who does not act when the 
individual has a legal duty to do so.180 Such a duty can be found in an 
employer-employee relationship.181 This duty is referred to as a “duty to 
control conduct of others.”182 In order for the duty to arise, the employer 
must be aware of the circumstances which require action on his part,183 
and the employee must commit his crimes while in the scope of his 
employment.184 Under this theory, church officials who knew of a priest’s 
sexual abuse of children had a duty to control the conduct of the priest, 
provided that the priest was acting within the scope of his employment. 
While several jurisdictions considering tort actions185 have concluded that 
a priest who engages in sexual abuse of a parishioner is not acting within 
 180. LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 3.3, at 214. “Most crimes are committed by affirmative action 
rather than by non-action. But there are a number of statutory crimes which . . . may be committed . . . 
by failure to act under circumstances giving rise to a legal duty to act.” Id. 
 181. Id. at 219. 
 182. Id. “[A]n employer has a . . . duty to curb his employee while the latter is performing the 
employer’s business.” Id. While some may assert that the abusive priests were not performing the 
employer’s business while children were being abused, this argument is unpersuasive. Children were 
molested as they readied the mass in the sacristy. SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 13. Many children 
were abused in the churches’ rectories. See, e.g., BETRAYAL, supra note 6, at 85, 87. Furthermore, the 
predatory priests gained access to children as a direct result of their position as priests. See, e.g., id. at 
88. “[The allegedly sexually abusive Rev. Joseph L. Welsh] had been a de facto family member for 
three decades.” Id. “Much the same fate befell a Maine family . . . ” as “their home became [an abusive 
priest’s] second home.” Id. 
 183. LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 3.3(b), at 219.  
Though one might otherwise be under a duty to act, so that omission to do so would ordinarily 
render him criminally liable, the prevailing view is that he may not be held liable if he does not 
know the facts indicating a duty to act. Thus, while a father normally has a duty to rescue his 
young child from drowning, if he does not know that the child is in the water then his ignorance 
may relieve him from criminal responsibility for the child’s death.  
Id. 
 184. Id. § 3.3(a)(6), at 219.  
 185. Id. § 3.3(a)(7), at 219. LaFave notes that, “[o]ver the years of the development of tort and 
criminal law, the trend has been in the direction of creating new situations wherein an affirmative duty 
to act is imposed,” and remarks that “[t]he civil cases are closely analogous to criminal cases. Id. at 
219 n.36 (citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984)). 
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the scope of his employment,186 some jurisdictions have concluded that 
employee acts of sexual abuse did occur in the scope of employment.187 
These courts have found acts of sexual abuse to have occurred during the 
scope of employment when, inter alia, “the acts that led to the injury . . . 
were within the scope of employment.”188  
 186. See, e.g., Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 960, 963 (Conn. 1998) 
(citing Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 921 F. Supp. 66, 69-70; Rita M. v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Los Angeles, 187 Cal.App.3d 1453 (1986); Joshua S. v. Casey, 615 N.Y.S.2d 200 
(1994); Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 60, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991); Kennedy v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Burlington, 921 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D.Vt. 1996); Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church of 
New Orleans, 32 F.3d 953, 959 (5th Cir.1994)). See also Byrd et al., v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 588 
(Ohio 1991) (“[A]n employer is not liable for independent self-serving acts of his employees which in 
no way facilitate or promote his business); but see Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Ct. 
App. Ore. 1989). Erickson states:  
An employee’s act is within the scope of the employment if it occurs substantially within the time 
and space limits authorized by the employment, the employee is at least partially motivated by a 
purpose to serve the employer, and the act is of a kind which the employee was hired to perform.  
Id. (citing Chesterman v. Barmon, 753 P.2d 404 (Ore. 1988) (en banc)). 
 187. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1368-71 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying 
Washington state law to determine the scope of employment); G.B. v. Archdiocese of Portland in 
Oregon, 2001 WL 34041144, at *3-4 (D. Or. 2001); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & 
Neurology, Ltd., et al., 329 N.W.2d 306, 310-311 (Minn. 1983); Fearing v. Bucher, 977 P.2d 1163, 
1166-68 (Or. 1999); Chesterman v. Barmon, 753 P.2d 404, 406 (Or. 1988) (en banc); Gulf, C. & S.F. 
Ry. Co. v. Cobb, 45 S.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Civ. App. Tex. 1931).  
 188. Fearing, 977 P.2d at 1166 n.4. The Fearing court remarked that “an employee’s intentional 
tort rarely, if ever, will have been authorized expressly by the employer. In that context, then, it 
virtually always will be necessary to look to the acts that led to the injury to determine if those acts 
were within the scope of employment.” Id. (emphasis in original) In Fearing, the court considered a 
case of priest sexual abuse. Id. at 1164. The court concluded that “a jury could infer that the sexual 
assaults were the culmination of a progressive series of actions that began with and continued to 
involve Bucher’s performance of the ordinary and authorized duties of a priest.” Id. at 1167. The court 
continued, stating “the jury also could infer that, in cultivating a relationship with plaintiff and his 
family, Bucher, at least initially, was motivated by a desire to fulfill his priestly duties and that, over 
time, his motives became mixed.” Id. Ultimately, the court determined that the priest’s intentional torts 
could be found by a jury to have occurred “within the scope of employment.” Id.  
 See also Chesterman, 753 P.2d at 406. The Chesterman court concluded that an employee, who 
ingested drugs to enable him to work, and while under the influence of these drugs, raped a woman in 
her home, could have been acting within the scope of his employment. Id. The court indicated that 
when there exists “a ‘time-lag’ between the act allegedly producing the harm [the taking of the drug to 
enable the employee to work] and the resulting harm [the rape] [,] [t]he focus should be on the act on 
which the vicarious liability is based and not on when the act results in injury. Id. (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted).  
 In a similar case, Lourim v. Swensen, the court concluded that “a jury could reasonably infer that 
the sexual assaults were merely the culmination of a progressive series of actions that involved the 
ordinary and authorized duties of a Boy Scout leader.” 977 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Ore. 1999). See also 
Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1368. 
Washington agency law has long held that a master cannot excuse himself when any ‘authorized 
act was improperly or unlawfully performed,’ nor can he excuse himself when an unauthorized act 
is done in conjunction with other acts which are within the scope of duties the employee is 
instructed to perform.  
Id. (citations omitted). See also Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 311 n.3 (suggesting a jury instruction 
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If Church officials failed to exercise the legal duty that arose from the 
employer-employee relationship, these officials may be criminally liable 
for the priest’s crimes, provided that one more legal hurdle can be 
crossed.189 Specifically, there must be a shared mental state on the part of 
the employer and the employee who commits the criminal act.190 While 
this shared mental state is unlikely to be shared in acts of sexual abuse 
which commonly require specific intent, this shared mental state could 
theoretically exist in crimes which require a recklessness mental state.191 
Several states have statutes for assault that could encompass the criminal 
act of the priest, and yet allow for a variety of mental states, including 
recklessness.192 These statutes would, at least on a theoretical level, allow 
regarding the scope of employment that reads, in part: “The test is not necessarily whether the specific 
conduct was expressly authorized or forbidden by the principal but rather whether such conduct should 
fairly have been foreseen from the nature of the employment and the duties relating to it.”); 
Archdiocese of Portland, 2001 WL 34041144 at *3-4; Cobb, 45 S.W.2d at 326. The Archdiocese of 
Portland court states:  
[T]he master is liable for any such act of the servant which, if isolated, would not be imputable to 
the master, but which is so connected with and immediately grows out of another act of the 
servant imputable to the master, that both acts are treated as one indivisible tort, which for the 
purposes of the master’s liability, takes its color and quality from the earlier act. 
Id. 
 189. See Moreland v. State, 139 S.E. 77, 78-79 (Ga. 1927) (holding the owner of a car criminally 
liable for involuntary manslaughter because he had a duty to control the unlawful driving of his 
chauffer).  
 190. See LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 3.3(a)(6), at 219; Id. § 3.3(e), at 223.  
 191. Id. § 3.3(e), at 223.  
It would seem that criminal battery may be committed by an omission to act (if there exists a duty 
to act), as well as by an affirmative act. If a parent, knowing that injury is substantially certain to 
result to his infant child unless he acts to prevent it, fails to act, and the infant is injured but not 
killed as a result, the parent would doubtless be guilty of battery. The same result should follow if 
his omission amounted to recklessness, though he did not intend any injury to the child. 
Id. LaFave notes, “These hypothetical cases are but applications of the rules that battery may be 
committed by intention to injure or by recklessness.” Id. n.66 (citation omitted). 
 192.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-22 (1994). Under section (a) of this provision:  
(a) A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if: 
(1) With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes physical injury to any person; 
or 
(2) He recklessly causes physical injury to another person . . . .  
Id. See also MO. REV. STAT. § 565.070 (2000) (“1. A person commits the crime of assault in the third 
degree if: (1) The person attempts to cause or recklessly causes physical injury to another person 
. . . .”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203(West 2001) (“A. A person commits assault by: 1. Intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly causing any physical injury to another person . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18-3-204 (2002) (“A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if he knowingly or 
recklessly causes bodily injury to another person . . . . ”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-7 (2000) (“(1) A 
person is guilty of simple assault if he (a) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly 
causes bodily injury to another . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:2-a (1996) (“I. A person is guilty 
of simple assault if he: (a) Purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury or unprivileged physical 
contact to another; or (b) Recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-
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for a finding of shared mental states between the priests who committed 
the assaults and their employers who acted recklessly when they failed to 
control the priests’ conduct.193  
III. ANALYSIS 
The prevalence and pervasiveness194 of priest sex abuse indicate that 
the measures used in the past will likely prove insufficient to prevent 
future harm to children.195 Given the Vatican’s continued insistence on the 
primacy of canon law,196 and its concomitant refusal to adopt a policy that 
would require the church to turn over suspected pedophiles to the 
police,197 many are circumspect that anything will change.198 Criminal 
liability for the decision makers would make it absolutely clear that 
perpetuating child sexual abuse is criminal; no measure of religious stature 
places one above the law.199
A. Prosecution Under State RICO Statutes 
States whose RICO provisions specifically enumerate sexual abuse as a 
predicate crime should be successful in prosecuting the church and its 
officials as well as sexually abusive priests under their RICO statutes. 
These prosecutions could closely mirror the successful prosecution in 
Miskovsky. Of particular significance in the priest sex abuse context is the 
1 (West 2003) (“A person is guilty of [simple] assault if he: (1) Attempts to cause or purposely, 
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . .”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 
1998) (“A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: 1. With intent to cause physical injury 
to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or 2. He recklessly causes 
physical injury to another person . . . .”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-1 (Michie 2003) (“Any person 
who: (1) Attempts to cause bodily injury to another, . . . and has the actual ability to cause the injury; 
(2) Recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101 (2003) (“(a) A 
person commits assault who: (1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another 
. . . .”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon 2003) (“Assault (a) A person commits an offense if 
the person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . .”); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 1023 (2003) (“(a) A person is guilty of simple assault if he: (1) attempts to cause 
or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another . . . .”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
501 (Michie 2003) (“(b) A person is guilty of battery if he . . . intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
causes bodily injury to another.”). 
 193. See WAYNE LAFAVE, supra note 20, §§ 3.3(a)(6), 3.3(e), at 219, 223.  
 194. Goodstein & Zirilli, supra note 43. 
 195. Paulson & Davis, supra note 3. “Victim advocates say they are convinced that the church 
will not punish bishops who failed to stop abuse, and so they are pinning their hopes on prosecutors.” 
Id. 
 196. Cooperman, supra note 53. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See supra notes 8, 10, 195. 
 199. See supra note 66. 
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Miskovsky court’s conclusion that crimes whose statute of limitations had 
run were nevertheless predicate crimes under the state’s RICO statute.200 
Moreover, the reasoning that supported a finding of an enterprise in 
Miskovsky supports a finding of an enterprise in the context of priest sex 
abuse.201 Just as Miskovsky’s law practice operated as a “legitimate 
business entity” and served as a means for Miskovsky to come into contact 
with his victims, so too have churches operated as legitimate non-profit 
corporations and served as a means for abusive priests to encounter their 
victims.202 Finally, given the scale of abuse committed by individual 
priests, it should not be difficult for courts to find evidence of a 
“continuing pattern” of sexual abuse sufficient to satisfy RICO 
requirements.203  
Likewise, states whose RICO provisions enumerate acts of fraud as 
predicate offenses may also successfully prosecute the Church and its 
officials under their RICO statutes.204 States might consider pursuing a 
theory of fraud which encompasses “conduct that involves a breach of 
duty and that results in harm to another.”205 Specifically, prosecutors 
might explore theories of fraud involving a breach of fiduciary duty on the 
part of the Church or Diocese, owed to its parishioners who were sexually 
abused.206 Prosecutors could likely find fraudulent activity in the “priest 
shuffling” activities of church officials, because priest shuffling involved 
 200. 31 P.3d at 1059. 
 201. Id. at 1062-63. 
 202. Id. See supra notes 174, 188.  
 203. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 204. See, e.g., Pamela Ferdinand, Suit Says Archdiocese Knew of Priest’s Abuse: Parishes Not 
Told, Lawyer Alleges, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2002, at A01. The WASHINGTON POST reported that “[t]he 
Archdiocese of Boston knowingly arranged the transfer of an accused serial pedophile priest to posts 
in [three states] for more than three decades without informing those parishes of his history, according 
to church documents . . . .” Id. The WASHINGTON POST further reported that “a letter, which cleared 
the way for Shanley to work at [a parish in California], certified that Shanley was ‘a priest in good 
standing. . . . ’” Id. This letter was penned by one of the Boston Archdiocese’s high-level officials. Id. 
The WASHINGTON POST also relayed that “Church leaders in [California] told the Boston Globe they 
would not have permitted Shanley to serve in their diocese had they known about his history.” Id.  
 205. 2 BRICKEY, supra note 86, § 8:32, at 89 (internal citations omitted).  
 206. For example, there are priest sexual abuse tort cases in which courts have found a fiduciary 
duty to exist between the Church or Diocese and the parishioner who suffered the abuse. See, e.g., 
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 431 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Where a 
person’s beliefs are alleged to give rise to a special legal relationship between him and his church, we 
may be required to consider with other relevant evidence the nature of that person’s beliefs in order to 
properly determine whether the asserted relationship in fact exists.”); Doe v. Evans, III, 814 So.2d 370, 
375 (Fla. 2002) (determining that “Doe’s breach of fiduciary [duty] claim states a cognizable cause of 
action). See generally Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by 
Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 45 (2001). 
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deception as well as contemplated harm.207 For example, church officials 
frequently lied to parishioners about the reason for their former priest’s 
departure in order to conceal the priest’s acts of sexual abuse.208 Lying, 
instead of disclosing the abuse, arguably delayed the revelation of other 
cases of abuse and in so doing, delayed treatment for those who had been 
abused and failed to prevent future incidents of abuse.209 Furthermore, 
when church officials recommended sexually abusive priests to new 
parishes without disclosing the danger posed by the priests’ presence, 
these officials endangered parishioners in the new parishes.210 Given the 
Church’s knowledge of the problem of recidivism,211 Church officials 
could have contemplated the harm that would result from transferring an 
abusive priest to an unsuspecting parish, namely, more acts of abuse 
perpetrated against more children.212  
Certainly, the act of “priest shuffling” did not comport with the 
standard “of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right 
dealing in the general and business life of members of society.”213 
However, the various churches’ failure to inform its parishioners of sexual 
abuse allegations is insufficient to prove fraud in the absence of a duty to 
disclose this information.214 This duty might be established as a fiduciary 
duty. Some jurisdictions considering tort cases involving priest sexual 
abuse have concluded that the Church or Diocese owed its parishioner a 
fiduciary duty.215 For example, in one case, the Second Circuit concluded 
that “the Diocese owed [the plaintiff], and youths with a similar 
relationship with the Diocese, a duty of care including a duty to investigate 
and warn or inform so as to prevent or alleviate harm to additional 
 207. See supra note 204, Part II.A; infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 208. Pamela Ferdinand, Parishes Not Told of Charges Against Priests, Law Says: Suspected Child 
Molesters Have Served in Many of Boston Archdiocese’s [sic] Churches, Cardinal Testifies in 
Deposition, WASH. POST. Aug. 14, 2002, at A2. The WASHINGTON POST reported,  
Cardinal . . . Law acknowledged returning priests to the ministry without alerting parishioners . . . . 
Overall, the Cardinal said he would consider it a ‘conservative’ estimate that suspected child 
molesters served at one time or another in more than 200 parishes in the Archdiocese of Boston.”  
Id. 
 209.  See, e.g., Martinelli 196 F.3d at 426.  
 210. See supra note 204. 
 211. See supra Part II.A. 
 212. See id.  
 213. Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958); 2 BRICKEY, supra note 86, 
§ 8:32, at 90. 
 214. See generally 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 204 (2001). “Before nondisclosure or 
fraudulent concealment can be considered, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to 
disclose the information claimed to have been suppressed. Accordingly, silence may constitute fraud 
when a duty to disclose exists.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 215. See supra note 206 and accompanying text 
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victims.”216 These cases may be helpful to prosecutors, because theories of 
duty in tort and criminal law are considered “closely analogous.”217  
Provided that prosecutors can establish the predicate acts of fraud, 
prosecutors would likely be able to establish the existence of an enterprise 
as well as a pattern of racketeering activity in the same manner as 
described above.218  
Generally, the use of state RICO statutes should alleviate statute of 
limitations problems caused by delayed reporting of child sex abuse, 
because many state RICO statutes provide a lengthy statute of 
limitations.219 Furthermore, state RICO prosecutions are not susceptible to 
ex post facto prohibitions provided that a predicate crime within the 
“pattern of racketeering activity” is committed after the statute became 
effective.220  
B. Prosecution Under a Theory of Reckless Endangerment 
When church decision makers placed sexually abusive priests in 
unsupervised parish settings, there can be little doubt that they acted 
recklessly;221 their actions created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
 216. Martinelli, 196 F.3d at 430. The Second Circuit did not reach the issue of whether the 
Diocese owed a duty to “parishioners generally.” Id. at 429. The court determined, however, that a 
fiduciary relationship did exist between the plaintiff and the Diocese based on his relationship with the 
diocese which is described in detail by the court. Id. at 429-30. 
 217. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 20, at § 3.3(a)(6), 219 n.36. 
 218. See notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text. 
 219. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 9-1. See, e.g., Estate of Kirschenbaum v. Kirschenbaum, 
793 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that while statute of limitations had expired on 
individual crimes comprising predicate acts, the statute of limitations under Arizona’s RICO statute 
had not expired). See supra note 200 and accompanying text.  
 220. See People v. Grant, 973 P.2d 72, 77 (Cal. 1999). The court noted that “application of a 
newly amended or enacted law to a so-called ‘straddle’ offense, that is, a crime that begins before and 
continues after the law’s effective date, does not violate the federal Constitution’s prohibition against 
ex post facto laws.” Id. (citing United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 355 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(allowing conviction provided that one act of racketeering activity within the “pattern” is committed 
after the statute’s effective date).  
 221. See, e.g., SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 172.  
The Grand Jury concludes that officials in the Diocese failed in their responsibility to protect 
children. They ignored credible complaints about the sexually abusive behaviors of priests. They 
failed to act on obvious warning signs of sexual abuse including instances where they were aware 
that priests had children in their private rooms in the rectory overnight, that priests were drinking 
alcohol with underage children and exposing them to pornography. Even where a priest disclosed 
sexually abusive behavior with children officials failed to act to remove him from ministry. 
Id. However, a problem may exist for prosecutors under the reckless endangerment theory of criminal 
liability because some state statutes explicitly define the injury or harm suffered by the victim in a 
manner that precludes sexual abuse from falling within the statutory definition. See, e.g. ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-1-2(9) (2002). “Serious physical injury. Physical injury which creates a substantial risk of 
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priest sex abuse and were accordingly a “gross deviation” from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would have exercised in the same 
or similar circumstances.222 Also, in some states, the actions of the 
cardinals and bishops should subject the Church to criminal liability 
because, while acting as diocesan “high managerial agents,” bishops and 
cardinals “recklessly tolerated” priest sexual abuse.223
C. Criminal Liability for Hindering Prosecution 
By examining the actions of Church officials surrounding incidents of 
priest sex abuse, prosecutors should be able to establish the elements of 
hindering prosecution. Indeed, a 2003 Grand Jury Report regarding priest 
sex abuse in Suffolk County, New York reached that conclusion.224 The 
report stated that “Diocesan officials agreed to engage in conduct that 
resulted in the prevention, hindrance and delay in the discovery of criminal 
conduct by priests.”225 The Grand Jury also concluded that church officials 
“conceived and agreed to a plan using deception and intimidation to 
prevent victims from seeking legal solutions to their problems.”226 In sum, 
the Grand Jury’s findings indicate that diocesan officials hindered the 
prosecution of sexually abusive priests.227 Provided that prosecutors could 
find similar fact patterns in other dioceses, other states with similar 
statutes might be able to mirror their cases after the grand jury findings in 
New York.228 Additionally, prosecutors in New York, North Dakota, and 
Utah could examine the possibility of using acts of hindering prosecution 
as predicate crimes for their state’s RICO statutes.229 This will likely 
lengthen the statute of limitations as well as increase the applicable 
penalties and enhance available remedies.230
death, or which causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” Id. 
 222. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). See also, e.g., SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 172. See 
also supra Part II.A. 
 223. See, e.g., People v. Aquarian Age 2000, Inc., 380 N.Y.S.2d 545, 548 (1976). “The broad 
principle is well established ‘that a corporation may be liable criminally for the acts of its agents in 
doing things prohibited by statute.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 224. SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 173.  
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Goodstein & Zirilli, supra note 43.  
 229. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 230. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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D. Prosecution for Failure To Act 
While it may seem strange to prosecute church officials for acts of 
assault committed by priests under their supervision, this theory of liability 
has been successfully used in the employer/employee context.231 
Employers have a duty to control the criminal actions of their employees, 
provided the employer is aware of the employee’s acts and the employee is 
acting within the scope of his employment.232 It can hardly be doubted that 
church officials were aware of the criminal acts of sexual abuse being 
committed by priests.233 As discussed above, some jurisdictions have 
found that acts of priest sexual abuse have occurred within the scope of 
employment.234 Additionally, several states have assault statutes that 
would encompass both the mental state of the priest and the priest’s 
employer.235 While this approach is far from an easy tack for a prosecutor 
to take, it is arguably worth the difficulty involved and the risk of failure 
in order to place criminal liability on church officials for their failure to 
control the conduct of predatory priests. 
Nevertheless, prosecutors face hurdles that may impede successful 
prosecution of the Church and its decision makers for their role in priest 
sexual abuse. Probably the most difficult obstacle for prosecutors to 
overcome is the problem posed by various statutes of limitation.236 Many 
children and their families did not come forward to police at the time of 
the sexual abuse.237 Victims and their families did not report the crimes to 
civil authorities for a host of reasons: because the Church told them not 
 231. The leading case is Moreland v. State. 139 S.E. 77 (Ga. 1927). In Moreland, the court held 
that the owner of a vehicle was guilty of “involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful 
act” even though the owner’s chauffer was driving. Id. at 78-79. The opinion states that because, “the 
owner of the car was in control thereof, . . . he should have seen to it that his chauffer did not operate 
the car in such a manner contrary to law . . . .” Id. at 79. The court remonstrated that “[i]t would be the 
owner’s duty, when he saw that the law was being violated . . . to curb and restrain one in his 
employment and under his control, and prevent him from violating the law . . . .” Id. 
 232. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 3.3(a)(6), at 219. 
 233. See, e.g., Betrayal, supra note 6, at 205-49 (containing photographic reproductions of Church 
documents concerning sexually abusive priests Fr. Geoghan and Fr. Shanley). 
 234. See supra note 187. 
 235. See supra note 192. 
 236. See, e.g., Walter v. Robinson, “Norfolk DA: Most Priests Can’t Be Tried, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Apr. 10, 2002. “Norfolk District Attorney . . . Keating, in a sharp rebuke to the Archdiocese of Boston 
for its longtime practice of shielding priests who molested children, said yesterday that the passage of 
time will prevent prosecutions of most of the priests whose names were referred to his office.” Id. 
 237. SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 171. “Frequently, because of the nature of child sexual abuse, 
the victims of this criminal activity do not and did not, in these cases, disclose it until they were adults. 
This was almost always after the statute of limitations for the criminal prosecution of these crimes had 
lapsed.” 
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to;238 because the Church assured the victims and their families that the 
offending priest would receive treatment and would not be allowed near 
children again;239 because the victim was ashamed;240 or because the 
family feared bringing the police into Church matters.241
As discussed above, statute of limitation problems are less pronounced 
in the context of state RICO prosecutions. However, they remain a hurdle 
for the alternative criminal theories suggested, including reckless 
endangerment, hindering prosecution, and criminal liability based on an 
omission to act.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
State legislatures should act to remove the enforcement hurdles faced 
by prosecutors, so that in the future, all of those responsible for the sexual 
abuse of children can be held criminally liable.  
In general, state legislatures should extend the statute of limitations on 
crimes of sexual abuse until the time the victim has reached adulthood.242 
It is well known that children often do not reveal sexual abuse until several 
years later.243 The phenomenon of delayed reporting in cases of sexual 
abuse should not prevent child molesters from facing prosecution.244  
State legislatures should also add explicit provisions concerning child 
sex abuse to their reckless endangerment statutes and lengthen the statute 
of limitations for prosecutions of reckless endangerment that involve child 
sex abuse.245 Likewise, states would be well advised to extend the statute 
of limitations for hindering prosecution when the crime being concealed is 
child sex abuse.246  
 238. See, e.g., Betrayal, supra note 6, at 214-15. A family member of abused victims wrote a letter 
to Cardinal Mediros, which stated, inter alia, “It was suggested that we keep silent to protect the boys - 
that is absurd since minors are protected under law, and I do not wish to hear that remark again, since 
it is insulting to our intelligence.” Id. at 214. 
 239. See, e.g., id. at 20. A mother of an abused child was told, “He will never be a priest again.” 
Id.  
 240. See, e.g., SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 97 (detailing the nature of Child Sexual Abuse 
Syndrome).  
 241. See, e.g., Betrayal, supra note 6, at 214-15. As discussed supra in note 238, a woman sent a 
letter to the then Cardinal of the Boston Archdiocese regarding her family members’ abuse by a parish 
priest. The woman wrote, “We did not question the Authority of the Church two years ago, but left it 
entirely in your hands.” Id.  
 242. SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 175.  
 243. Id. at 173. 
 244. Id. at 175-76. 
 245. See, e.g., Annotated Laws of Massachusetts ch. 265, § 13L (2002).  
 246. SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 176. 
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Currently, several states do not have a mandatory reporting statute that 
would require those who work in specific professions to report their 
suspicions of child abuse to civil authorities.247 Even when states have 
enacted mandatory reporting statues, the statutes are often flawed because 
they only mandate reporting of suspected child abuse “committed by a 
parent, guardian, or other person legally responsible for a child.”248 
Accordingly, child abuse committed by a priest or anyone outside of the 
child’s family who is not “legally responsible for [the] child” is not 
required to be reported.249 Additionally, many of these statutes do not 
include members of the clergy as mandatory reporters.250 To close the 
existing statutory gaps, all states should enact a reporting statute that 
includes the clergy, church officials and staff in its mandate.251 
Furthermore, these statutes should require reporting regardless of the 
relationship of the abuser to the victim: it should not matter if the 
suspected abuser is the child’s parent, guardian, or priest.252
V. CONCLUSION 
State legislatures and prosecutors must not rely on the church to change 
itself; tragically, victims and their families have already made that 
 247. Currently the following states have mandatory reporting statutes. This list does not include 
those states who only require reporting post mortem. Alabama, ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (1975); 
California, CAL. PEN. CODE § 11166 (2000); Florida, FLA. STAT. ch. 39.201 (2003); Georgia, GA. 
CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2003); Illinois, 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.19 (2003); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 232.69 
(2003); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (2001); Louisiana, LA. CHILDREN’S CODE ANN. 609 
(1995); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2002); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN., § 41-3-101 (2000); 
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 (1995); New Hampshire, 12 RSA 169-C:2 (2002); New York, 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-n (1999); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2001); Oregon, 
OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (1993); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (1995); Utah, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 53A-6-502 (2000); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (2000). 
 248. See, e.g., SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 104-05. 
 249. Id. at 205. The Suffolk County Grand Jury Report states: 
[Mandatory reporters] are not required to report cases of abuse and/or neglect where the 
perpetrator is a legal stranger to the child. Therefore, revising the current statute to make clergy 
mandatory reporters would give them the legal responsibility only to report the abuse of a child 
committed by a parent, guardian or other person legally responsible, not abuse committed by 
another member of the clergy. 
Id. 
 250. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. See generally Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy 
Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 
71 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1987). It should be noted that the Boston Archdiocese opposed the inclusion of 
clergy in the Massachusetts mandatory reporting statute. See Betrayal, supra note 6, at 134. Following 
the revelations of abuse, however, clergy have been added. Id. 
 251. SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 178 (demanding such a statute for New York). 
 252. Id. at 177. 
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mistake.253 Heinous crimes were committed with impunity for decades.254 
Because current remedies have not proved sufficient either to change the 
Church’s methods of handling abusive priests or to punish the Church’s 
leadership for their role in the criminal sex abuse of children, states should 
pursue criminal charges against the Archdioceses, Dioceses, Parishes, 
Cardinals, Bishops, and Pastors who made decisions to place pedophiles in 
parish positions with unsupervised access to children, either through State 
RICO statutes or through alternate theories of criminal liability such as 
reckless endangerment, hindering prosecution, and omission to act.255 
Additionally, states must legislate greater protection for children by 
creating effective reporting statutes, and extending the statute of 
limitations for crimes involving the sexual abuse of children.256  
Laura Russell∗
 253. Id. at 171. “The spotlight shining on the Diocese from the outside world is the only thing that 
caused them to change their behavior.” Id. 
 254. Goodstein & Zirilli, supra note 43.  
 255. See discussion infra Parts II-III. 
 256. SUFFOLK REP., supra note 2, at 175-79. 
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